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1. Introduction
When considering the eﬃciency of organisations (be they branches, ﬁrms, countries etc.)
it is useful to consider not only individual eﬃciencies but also the combined eﬃciency of a
group (e.g. an industry) or a sub-group within a group. Measuring group eﬃciency dates back
to Farrell (1957), who introduced the notion of structural eﬃciency. Important contributions
were made by Førsund & Hjalmarsson (1979), who considered measuring the average deci-
sion making unit, Li & Ng (1995), who derived an aggregation scheme using shadow prices,
Ylvinger (2000), who used weights derived from Data Envelopment Analysis, and Blackorby
& Russell (1999) who found several impossibility results for eﬃciency aggregation. Recently,
Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) developed an aggregation scheme for measuring group eﬃciency
which is justiﬁed from an economic theory perspective. However, this aggregation scheme re-
quired the assumption that the current input endowment across ﬁrms in the group was taken
as given and could not be reallocated between those ﬁrms. This assumption was relaxed
by Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) who determined group eﬃciency measures allowing inputs
to be reallocated between decision making units within the group. This is an important
consideration for cases where such reallocation is possible - such as when the organisations
considered are branches within a ﬁrm, when ﬁrms are merging within an industry, or when
countries are merging into an economic union where reallocation of inputs is an important
aspect. For a speciﬁc example, consider a bank with multiple branches. They can move staﬀ,
capital and other inputs between these branches, and so treating these inputs as ﬁxed when
measuring the eﬃciency of the overall bank fails to consider the true possibilities available
to the bank. It is also important to consider not just group eﬃciency at one time period,
but to also look at how it changes over time. The Malmquist productivity index of Caves,
Christensen & Diewert (1982) is a natural candidate for doing this, as it is popular for empir-
ical use and has a number of interesting decompositions available. The aggregation scheme
of Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) has already been extended intertemporally for the aggregation
of Malmquist productivity indexes by Zelenyuk (2006). In our work, we seek to extend the
group aggregation results allowing reallocation with the Malmquist productivity index to
enable consideration of the change in group productivity over time, allowing reallocation of
inputs across decision making units (when considering output orientation). This is a diﬀerent
approach (though with similar results) to the area of index number aggregation (for example
see Diewert (1983, 1985) and references contained therein). The resulting information from
our measures is of particular value to managers/leaders of merged ﬁrms/countries, or man-
agers of branches within an organisation, as it allows them to measure the success or failure
over time of endeavours to increase group output by reallocating inputs amongst individual
units within the group.
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Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the key deﬁnitions for individual
eﬃciency measures, and Sections 3 and 4 consider group eﬃciency measures, ﬁrst assuming
inputs cannot be reallocated and then relaxing this assumption. Section 5 then considers
aggregation for Malmquist productivity indexes and group results assuming no reallocation
of inputs. The main results are given in Section 6, which derives group Malmquist pro-
ductivity indexes when relaxing the assumption of no reallocation, in such a way that the
indexes decompose analogously to the original eﬃciency measures. Section 6 also discusses
some important matters regarding practical implementation of these indexes. Section 7 then
illustrates these results with a numerical example, using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
to calculate the eﬃciency and productivity measures. Finally, Section 8 concludes the study,
highlighting possible areas for future research.
2. Individual Measures
Let us begin by considering individual eﬃciency measures for a group of K decision
making units (DMUs), indexed k = 1, . . . , K. DMUs could be individual branches, whole
ﬁrms/organisations, industries or even countries, depending on the purpose of the study.
A DMU k uses a vector xk = (xk1, . . . , x
k
N)
′ ∈ N+ of N inputs to produce a vector yk =
(yk1 , . . . , y
k
M)
′ ∈ M+ of M outputs. Let the individual technology of DMU k at a given time
period τ be represented by the technology set T kτ , deﬁned as:
T kτ ≡ {(xk, yk) ∈ N+ ×M+ :
DMU k can produce yk from xk using the technology in period τ}. (1)
The technology for DMU k at period τ can be equivalently characterised using the output
correspondence, P kτ : N+ → 2M+ where:
P kτ (x
k) ≡ {yk ∈ M+ : (xk, yk) ∈ T kτ }, xk ∈ N+ . (2)
The technology of each DMU is assumed to satisfy standard regularity axioms (see Fa¨re
& Primont (1995) for more details). We impose these axioms throughout the paper as
regularity conditions, though some of the results could be obtained with weaker assumptions
(e.g. substituting weak disposability of inputs in place of free disposability). Speciﬁcally
(∀k = 1, . . . , K and ∀τ) we assume:
Axiom 1: The technology set T kτ is closed.
Axiom 2: The output set P kτ (x
k) is bounded ∀xk ∈ N+ .
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Axiom 3: There is no ‘free lunch’, that is, one cannot produce something from nothing.
Formally, (0N , y
k) /∈ T kτ , ∀yk ≥ 0M (i.e. yk ≥ 0M , yk = 0M).
Axiom 4: It is possible to produce nothing. Formally, 0M ∈ P kτ (xk), ∀xk ∈ N+ .
Axiom 5: Inputs and outputs are freely (strongly) disposable.
Formally (x0, y0) ∈ T kτ =⇒ (x, y) ∈ T kτ , ∀y  y0, ∀x  x0.
Axiom 6: Output sets P kτ (x
k) are convex, ∀xk ∈ N+ .
Axiom 6 is required to ensure duality results hold. We do not yet make the stronger assump-
tion that technology sets T k are convex, but will introduce it later when considering practical
estimation.
We also involve the output-oriented Shephard (1970) distance function Dkτ : N+ × M+ →
+ ∪ {∞}, deﬁned as:
Dkτ (x
k, yk) ≡ inf{θ : yk/θ ∈ P kτ (xk)}. (3)
This function completely characterises the technology T kτ in the sense that:
Dkτ (x
k, yk) ≤ 1 ⇔ (xk, yk) ∈ T kτ . (4)
We also use it to deﬁne the Farrell-type technical eﬃciency (TE) measure of DMU k in period
τ as:
TEkτ ≡ TEkτ (xk, yk) ≡ 1/Dkτ (xk, yk), (xk, yk) ∈ N+M+ . (5)
We also consider the dual characterisation of P kτ (x
k) given by the revenue function:
Rkτ (x
k, p) ≡ max
y
{py : y ∈ P kτ (xk)}, xk ∈ N+ , p ∈ M++, (6)
given a price row-vector p = (p1, . . . , pM) ∈ M++ corresponding to the M outputs. Note
that p is assumed to be the same for all DMUs, a necessary assumption for deriving the
aggregation results that follow, which we will discuss further in section 3. Given the revenue
function, the revenue eﬃciency (RE) for a DMU k at period τ is:
REkτ ≡ REkτ (xk, yk, p) ≡
Rkτ (x
k, p)
pyk
, for pyk = 0, (xk, yk) ∈ N+M+ , p ∈ M++. (7)
It will always be the case (for (xk, yk) ∈ T k) that REk(xk, yk, p) ≥ TEk(xk, yk), as a DMU
can be technically eﬃcient without being revenue eﬃcient, but a revenue eﬃcient DMU will
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always be technically eﬃcient. The multiplicative residual that closes the inequality is called
allocative eﬃciency (AE):
AEkτ ≡ AEkτ (xk, yk, p) ≡ REkτ (xk, yk, p)/TEkτ (xk, yk), (xk, yk) ∈ N+M+ , p ∈ M++, (8)
which immediately provides the following decomposition, which holds for any period τ :
REkτ (x
k, yk, p) = TEkτ (x
k, yk)× AEkτ (xk, yk, p),
∀(xk, yk) ∈ N+M+ , p ∈ M++, pyk = 0, (9)
which will be useful later.
3. Group Eﬃciency Without Reallocation
Following Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003), group eﬃciency measures can be constructed to mea-
sure the eﬃciency of a group of DMUs, taking current input endowments as given (an as-
sumption we will later relax in section 4 to allow reallocation of inputs between DMUs).
Here we focus on aggregating all DMUs in a group, but it is possible to extend these results
to aggregate separate subgroups of DMUs, and then consistently aggregate subgroups into
larger groups (see Simar & Zelenyuk (2007)).
Let X = (x1, . . . , xK), where xk ∈ N+ , be the input endowments amongst DMUs within
the group. We ﬁrst consider a group output set for period τ , the Minkowski sum of the
individual output sets for a given period τ :
P τ (X) ≡
K∑
⊕k=1
P kτ (x
k), xk ∈ N+ , k = 1, . . . , K. (10)
This group output set shows all output possibilities for the group for a given input allocation
X amongst DMUs. It can be used to deﬁne a group revenue function, analogous to the
individual revenue function:
Rτ (X, p) ≡ max
y
{py : y ∈ P τ (X)}, p ∈ M++, (11)
and accompanying group revenue eﬃciency measure
REτ ≡ REτ (X, Y , p) ≡ Rτ (X, p)
pY
, for pY = 0, (12)
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where Y =
∑K
k=1 y
k is the aggregate group output.
It should be noted that this assumes all DMUs face common output prices, and so group
revenue is maximised against the same prices as all individual revenue functions. This com-
mon price can be understood as a theoretical benchmark price for deriving group revenue
eﬃciency against, just as the true technology forms a benchmark for measuring group tech-
nical eﬃciency. In practice, prices are often constructed as averages using cost/revenue and
quantity data, so the industry average price can be taken as the common price (see e.g.
Fukuyama & Weber (2008)). Alternatively, shadow prices could be derived imposing the
Law of One Price (see e.g. Kuosmanen, Cherchye & Sipila¨inen (2006), Kuosmanen, Ko-
rtelainen, Sipila¨inen & Cherchye (2010)). Practitioners should be aware of the limitations
of these estimation methods for their own application, just as they should be aware of the
limitations of diﬀerent estimators of the technology. For example, the average price may be
misleading where managers make decisions on marginal prices (see e.g. Camanho & Dyson
(2005, 2008), Fukuyama & Weber (2008), Sahoo & Tone (2013))1. Our theoretical results
hold for the common theoretical price and technologies, making no assumptions speciﬁc to a
particular estimation technique, and so could be estimated using various techniques.
A crucial result here is the intertemporal extension by Zelenyuk (2006) of a result origi-
nally derived by Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003), which we summarise as a lemma:
Lemma 1. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions:
Rτ (X, p) =
K∑
k=1
Rkτ (x
k, p), xk ∈ N+ , p ∈ M++, (13)
so group revenue eﬃciency is:
REτ =
K∑
k=1
REτ (x
k, yk, p) · Sk, (14)
with weights
Sk =
pyk
pY
, k = 1, . . . , K. (15)
1We thank two anonymous referees for these insights.
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Moreover, REτ can be decomposed into aggregate technical and allocative components, as
REτ = TEτ × AEτ , ∀τ, (16)
where group technical eﬃciency is:
TEτ =
K∑
k=1
TEkτ (x
k, yk) · Sk, k = 1, . . . , K, (17)
and group allocative eﬃciency is:
AEτ =
K∑
k=1
AEkτ (x
k, yk, p) · Skae, (18)
with
Skae =
pyk∗∑K
k=1 py
k∗
where yk∗ = y
kTEkτ (x
k, yk), k = 1, . . . , K. (19)
Intuitively, this means that the maximum revenue for the overall group of DMUs is equal
to the sum of the individual maximum revenues. That is, if individual DMUs all maximise
their revenues given their input endowments and facing the same output prices, then the sum
will coincide with maximal group revenue deﬁned by (11). This then allows group eﬃciencies
to be expressed as a weighted sum of individual DMU eﬃciencies, and maintains a group
level decomposition (16) analogous to the individual level decomposition (9).
It is worth noting that an advantage of this aggregation scheme is that it is not ad hoc
but is derived from economic theoretic arguments; revenue optimisation, a particular struc-
ture of group technology given by (10), and taking as given common output prices and the
existing input allocation of each DMU, besides the regularity axioms of production theory.
In the next section we discuss relaxing the assumption of no input reallocation presupposed
by (10).
4. Group Eﬃciency with Reallocation
The assumption that inputs cannot be reallocated across DMUs was relaxed by Nesterenko
& Zelenyuk (2007) (who in turn utilised some results from Li & Ng (1995)), whose results
we summarise next. Unlike that paper, we consider an inter-temporal framework so we can
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use these results in Malmquist productivity indexes later.
Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) note that given the Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) deﬁnition of
a group output set, (10), if DMUs were operating under non-constant returns to scale (or
some have superior technologies) there may be unrealised output gains from reallocating
inputs between DMUs. Such gains would be over and above those gains from all DMUs
operating eﬃciently given their current input endowment. To measure this, consider a group
potential technology which is the Minkowski sum of individual DMU technologies in a given
period τ :
T gτ ≡
K∑
⊕k=1
T kτ . (20)
This technology aggregation structure was also proposed by Li & Ng (1995) and Blackorby
& Russell (1999). It can be equivalently characterised by the group potential output set :
P gτ (X) = {y : (X, y) ∈ T gτ }, (21)
where X ≡∑Kk=1 xk is aggregate group input.
We now deﬁne the corresponding eﬃciency measures, following Nesterenko & Zelenyuk
(2007). Speciﬁcally, let the group potential technical eﬃciency be:
TEgτ ≡ TEgτ (X, Y ) ≡ max
θ
{θ : θY ∈ P gτ (X)}. (22)
Similarly, we can consider the dual characterisation of P gτ (X), the group potential revenue
function:
Rgτ (X, p) ≡ max
y
{py : y ∈ P gτ (X)}. (23)
Given this, let the group potential revenue eﬃciency be:
REgτ ≡ REgτ (X, Y , p) ≡
Rgτ (X, p)
pY
. (24)
It must be also clear that REgτ (X, Y , p) ≥ TEgτ (X, Y ), and with the same logic as the indi-
vidual level, we can close this inequality by deﬁning the group potential allocative eﬃciency
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as:
AEgτ ≡ AEgτ (X, Y , p) ≡ REgτ (X, Y , p)/TEgτ (X, Y ). (25)
It immediately follows that:
REgτ = TE
g
τ × AEgτ , ∀τ. (26)
Intuitively, these measures are deﬁned similarly to the individual eﬃciency measures, but
now measure group eﬃciency w.r.t. the potential output set (21). They thus allow for inputs
to be reallocated amongst DMUs in the group each period before determining group output
for that period (which already implicitly allows outputs to be reallocated within the group).
If we compare the group output sets with and without allowing full reallocation, we have the
following important result:
Lemma 2. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions:
P τ (X) ⊆ P gτ (X). (27)
See Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) for the proof. In words, the linearly aggregated output
set (not allowing full reallocation) will always be a subset of the group potential output set
(allowing full reallocation). This implies that Rgτ (X, p) ≥ Rτ (X, p) which in turn implies
REgτ (X, Y , p) ≥ REτ (X, Y , p). The multiplicative residual closing this inequality is respon-
sible for reallocation, and so following the terminology in Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) is
called group revenue reallocative eﬃciency, and is deﬁned as:
RREgτ ≡ Rgτ (X, p)/Rτ (X, p). (28)
It immediately follows that:
REgτ = REτ ×RREgτ , ∀τ. (29)
We now state a useful decomposition we have for RREgτ , in the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions, we have:
RREgτ = TRE
g
τ × AREgτ , ∀τ, (30)
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where group technical reallocative eﬃciency is
TREgτ ≡ TEgτ /TEτ , (31)
and group allocative reallocative eﬃciency is
AREgτ ≡ AEgτ /AEτ . (32)
Intuitively, each of these measure the residual component due to allowing full reallocation
of inputs - the relative diﬀerence for the group between all DMUs being individually eﬃcient
(given their individual input endowments) and the group being collectively eﬃcient (allowing
reallocation of inputs between DMUs). The graphical intuition of group, group potential and
group reallocative revenue eﬃciency can be seen in Figure 1 in Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007).
Given (27), it will always be the case (for feasible input-output combinations) that RREgτ ≥ 1
and TREgτ ≥ 1, with each equal to unity only when all DMUs are individually and collec-
tively Farrell-type eﬃcient. However, we cannot say what AREgτ will be - it could be less
than unity if the current group output mix is closer to maximising group potential revenue
rather than individual revenues, and greater than unity in the opposite case.
Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) also present reallocative measures for individual DMUs, de-
ﬁned as
RREkτ ≡ REgτ /REkτ , (33)
TREkτ ≡ TEgτ /TEkτ , (34)
AREkτ ≡ AEgτ /AEkτ . (35)
These can then be aggregated into the group reallocative measures, which we summarise as
Lemma 4 (see Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) for more details).
9
  
Lemma 4. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions:
RREgτ =
(
K∑
k=1
(RREkτ )
−1 · Sk
)−1
, (36)
TREgτ =
(
K∑
k=1
(TREkτ )
−1 · Sk
)−1
, (37)
AREgτ =
(
K∑
k=1
(AREkτ )
−1 · Skae
)−1
, (38)
with the weights deﬁned in (15) and (19).
Finally, decompositions (16), (29) and (30) imply a ﬁnal decomposition of aggregate
eﬃciency:
REgτ = TEτ × AEτ × TREgτ × AREgτ , ∀τ. (39)
Our objective is to determine group Malmquist productivity indexes that maintain analogous
decompositions to those expressed in (39).
5. Change in Group Productivity Over Time Without Reallocation
We now turn to consider the change in group productivity over time, measured using
the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). This inter-temporal extension was provided by
Zelenyuk (2006), whose results we summarise here, to be further extended to allow for real-
location of inputs in section 6.
The productivity change from period s to period t can be measured by the Malmquist pro-
ductivity index of Caves et al. (1982), which in output orientation can be deﬁned for a DMU
k as
Mkst ≡ Mkst(xks , xkt , yks , ykt ) =
[(
TEks (x
k
t , y
k
t )
TEks (x
k
s , y
k
s )
· TE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t )
TEkt (x
k
s , y
k
s )
)−1]1/2
. (40)
Note that it is now important to keep track of the time-subscripts of the input-output(-
price) combinations, as these can now diﬀer from the period of the technology they are being
measured by. It should be noted that sometimes this productivity index produces infeasible
results, that is, one or more of the technical eﬃciency scores are 0 (see Bjurek (1996)). Ker-
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stens, Hachem & Van de Woestyne (2010) review the empirical literature and conclude that
the prevalence of infeasible results depends on the strength of assumptions, and researchers
should be aware of this. For our purposes, we assume throughout that all the individual
distance functions considered yield strictly positive and ﬁnite values ensuring that all the
individual indexes and corresponding aggregation results are feasible. For example, this con-
dition is always satisﬁed in the DEA context for output oriented measures when technologies
are of non-increasing returns to scale. 2
Following Zelenyuk (2006) the revenue (or dual) MPI from period s to t is:
RMkst ≡ RMkst(xks , xkt , yks , ykt , ps, pt)
=
[(
REks (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt)
REks (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps)
· RE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt)
REkt (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps)
)−1]1/2
, (41)
and the allocative MPI from period s to t is:
AMkst ≡ AMkst(xks , xkt , yks , ykt , ps, pt)
=
[(
AEks (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt)
AEks (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps)
· AE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt)
AEkt (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps)
)−1]1/2
, (42)
with this decomposition holding for any input-output-price combination, any two periods s
and t, and for all k:
RMkst = M
k
st × AMkst, (43)
which we will want an analogue of at the aggregate level.
It is worth reﬂecting brieﬂy on what these measures mean, as the revenue and allocative
MPIs appear to have been overlooked apart from Maniadakis & Thanassoulis (2004) (who
present the input-oriented form) and Zelenyuk (2006), but in some respects are superior to
the primal MPI when price information is available because they take prices into account.
The primal MPI measures the change in productivity from periods s to t, with the ﬁrst frac-
tion measuring the change w.r.t.. technology in period s and the second w.r.t.. technology
in period t, without taking prices into account, which is useful when price information is
unavailable. By contrast, the revenue (or dual) MPI measures the change in productivity
2We thank an anonymous referee for this insightful comment.
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taking into account price information, so they also incorporate information on the allocative
(in)eﬃciency of DMUs. The decomposition (43) shows that the dual MPI can be decomposed
into a consideration of changes without and with prices, where the allocative MPI takes into
account changes in the productivity of the allocation of outputs over the two periods. This
can reﬂect both changes in the allocation itself as well as changes in the prices between pe-
riods, as this will change which allocations are most revenue eﬃcient.
Having deﬁned the individual MPIs, we now summarise the results of Zelenyuk (2006) for
the aggregate (group) MPIs in a lemma that we will use in deriving our results.
Lemma 5. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions, let the group revenue MPI
from period s to t be:
RM st ≡ RM st(Xs, Xt, Y s, Y t, ps, pt)
=
⎡
⎣
(∑K
k=1RE
k
s (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt) · Skt∑K
k=1RE
k
s (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps) · Sks
·
∑K
k=1RE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt) · Skt∑K
k=1RE
k
t (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps) · Sks
)−1⎤⎦
1/2
=
[(
REs(t)
REs(s)
· REt(t)
REt(s)
)−1]1/2
. (44)
Then for any two periods s and t this can be decomposed into technical and allocative com-
ponents as
RM st = M st × AM st, (45)
where
M st ≡ M st(Xs, Xt, Y s, Y t) =
[(
TEs(t)
TEs(s)
· TEt(t)
TEt(s)
)−1]1/2
, (46)
is the group technical MPI from period s to t, and
AM st ≡ AM st(Xs, Xt, Y s, Y t, ps, pt)
=
[(
AEs(t)
AEs(s)
· AEt(t)
AEt(s)
)−1]1/2
, (47)
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is the group allocative MPI from period s to t, with weights
Skae,j =
pjy
k
∗,j∑K
k=1 pjy
k
∗,j
where yk∗,j ≡ ykj TEkτ (xkj , ykj ), k = 1, . . . , K, τ, j = s, t. (48)
Thus the aggregate Malmquist productivity indexes can be constructed in such a way that
the aggregate indexes decompose in a manner analogous to the individual indexes. Each of
these group Malmquist productivity indexes are calculated from the individual eﬃciency
scores, by aggregating them appropriately. The Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) aggregation scheme
also makes it clear which weights to use for each group eﬃciency measure - the weights corre-
sponding to the period of the input-output-price combination, rather than the period of the
technology. By aggregating each group eﬃciency measure separately, changes in the share of
individual DMUs between periods are already accounted for by changes in the weights.
This aggregation scheme, however, does not allow for reallocation of inputs between DMUs,
which is important to allow for because there are potential output gains from such realloca-
tion. This would be particularly relevant for DMUs considering a merger, which makes such
reallocation possible and desirable - ﬁrms merging within an industry, countries merging into
a economic union that allows for reallocation of inputs, etc. In the next section, we relax
this restriction.
6. Change in Group Productivity Over Time With Reallocation
We now merge the concepts presented above to deﬁne group aggregate Malmquist produc-
tivity indexes for measuring the change in group potential productivity and group reallocative
productivity over time. These form the main results of this paper. In deriving a coherent
aggregation scheme, we want to ensure its consistency with economic theory and previous
aggregation schemes, and in particular we want it to have decompositions that are analogous
to the eﬃciency measures.
Our ﬁrst result proposes an aggregation scheme for the group potential MPI; satisfying a
decomposition analogous to (26) and maintaining consistency with previous aggregation re-
sults.
Proposition 1. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions, let the group potential
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revenue MPI from periods s to t be
RM gst ≡ RM gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t, ps, pt) =
[(
REgs (t)
REgs (s)
· RE
g
t (t)
REgt (s)
)−1]1/2
. (49)
Then for any two periods s and t, RM gst can be decomposed into technical and allocative
components as
RM gst = M
g
st × AM gst, (50)
where
M gst ≡ M gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t) =
[(
TEgs (t)
TEgs (s)
· TE
g
t (t)
TEgt (s)
)−1]1/2
, (51)
is the group potential technical MPI from periods s to t, and
AM gst ≡ AM gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t, ps, pt) =
[(
AEgs (t)
AEgs (s)
· AE
g
t (t)
AEgt (s)
)−1]1/2
, (52)
is the group potential allocative MPI from periods s to t.
The proof of this proposition follows from substituting the decomposition of group poten-
tial revenue eﬃciency, (26), into the group potential revenue MPI, (49), for each period, and
then rearranging to separate out the group potential technical and allocative MPI measures.
Intuitively, this proposition shows that we can deﬁne the group potential revenue MPI in
the same style as the group MPI measures in section 5, and this can be decomposed into
group potential technical and allocative MPI measures which are also in the same style as
other group MPI measures. Similarly to the group technical MPI, the group potential tech-
nical MPI measures the change in group productivity from period s to t, but now allowing
for reallocation of inputs between DMUs within the group. Likewise, the group potential
revenue MPI measures the change in group revenue productivity, allowing for reallocation of
inputs, and (unlike the group potential technical MPI) takes into account price information.
The decomposition allows the researcher to determine which productivity changes are due to
changes in group technology or group technical eﬃciency, and which are due to changes in
output prices or group allocative eﬃciency.
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We also want to decompose the group potential revenue MPI into group revenue and group
revenue reallocative MPI measures, analogous to decomposition (29) and consistent with
previous results. This is achieved in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions, we have:
RM gst = RM st ×RRM gst, (53)
which holds for any two periods s and t, where RM st is deﬁned in (44) and where
RRM gst ≡ RRM gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t, ps, pt) =
[(
RREgs (t)
RREgs (s)
· RRE
g
t (t)
RREgt (s)
)−1]1/2
=
[∑K
k=1(RRE
k
s (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt))
−1 · Skt∑K
k=1(RRE
k
s (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps))
−1 · Sks
·
∑K
k=1(RRE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt))
−1 · Skt∑K
k=1(RRE
k
t (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps))
−1 · Sks
]1/2
, (54)
is the group revenue reallocative MPI from periods s to t. The last equality following from
substituting (36) in place of the group revenue reallocative eﬃciency.
Similarly to Proposition 1, the proof follows by substituting the decomposition of group
potential revenue eﬃciency, (29), into the group potential revenue MPI, (49), and then rear-
ranging to separate out the group revenue MPI and group revenue reallocative MPI measures.
In words, the group reallocative revenue MPI captures the productivity change component
due to allowing full reallocation, beyond that of all DMUs in the group operating eﬃciently.
Improvements in this measure indicate that group potential revenue productivity has grown
faster than group revenue productivity, implying that the group has moved closer to the
optimal production level/allocation when allowing full reallocation of resources than the pro-
duction level/allocation when restricting reallocation.
Moreover, the value of decomposition (53) is that it can reveal the source of group potential
revenue productivity changes. For example, if group potential revenue productivity improves,
this could be in a way which also improves group revenue productivity proportionally, e.g.
technological improvement (then group revenue reallocative productivity would be close to
unity); in a way which is neutral for group revenue productivity, e.g. shifts along the frontier
(then group revenue reallocative productivity would increase proportionally); in a way which
lowers group revenue productivity, e.g. shifts towards the optimal group allocation at the
cost of individual eﬃciency (then group revenue reallocative productivity would increase even
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more than group revenue potential productivity), or with some combination of improvement
of group revenue productivity and group revenue reallocative productivity.
In turn, we can decompose the group revenue reallocative MPI into technical and alloca-
tive reallocative MPIs over time, analogous to (30):
Proposition 3. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions, we have:
RRM gst = TRM
g
st × ARM gst, (55)
which holds for any two periods s and t, where
TRM gst ≡ TRM gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t) =
[(
TREgs (t)
TREgs (s)
· TRE
g
t (t)
TREgt (s)
)−1]1/2
=
[∑K
k=1(TRE
k
s (x
k
t , y
k
t ))
−1 · Skt∑K
k=1(TRE
k
s (x
k
s , y
k
s ))
−1 · Sks
·
∑K
k=1(TRE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t ))
−1 · Skt∑K
k=1(TRE
k
t (x
k
s , y
k
s ))
−1 · Sks
]1/2
, (56)
is the group technical reallocative MPI from periods s to t, and
ARM gst ≡ ARM gst(Xs, X t, Y s, Y t, ps, pt) =
[(
AREgs (t)
AREgs (s)
· ARE
g
t (t)
AREgt (s)
)−1]1/2
=
[∑K
k=1(ARE
k
s (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt))
−1 · Skae,t∑K
k=1(ARE
k
s (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps))
−1 · Skae,s
·
∑K
k=1(ARE
k
t (x
k
t , y
k
t , pt))
−1 · Skae,t∑K
k=1(ARE
k
t (x
k
s , y
k
s , ps))
−1 · Skae,s
]1/2
,
(57)
is the group allocative reallocative MPI from periods s to t. Again, the last equalities come
from Lemma 4.
Similarly to before, the proof of this follows from substituting the decomposition of group
revenue reallocative eﬃciency, (30), into the group revenue reallocative MPI, (54), and then
rearranging to separate the group technical and allocative reallocative MPI measures.
Intuitively, this decomposition allows us to identify the sources of changes in the group
revenue reallocative MPI. One source is due to changes in the group technical reallocative
MPI, which reﬂects that changes in the group technology allow additional potential gains in
technical eﬃciency from reallocation. Another source is due to changes in the group allocative
reallocative MPI, which reﬂects price changes leading to the group input-output combination
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being closer to all DMUs being individually eﬃcient (given input endowments) or the group
collectively being eﬃcient (allowing for reallocation). It is also important to note that each
component of (54) to (57) can be constructed from the individual eﬃciency measures.
By determining these group MPI measures such that they are consistent with previous ag-
gregation results, and in particular have analogous decompositions to the group eﬃciency
measures, it is also the case that other group decompositions not yet mentioned hold analo-
gously for these MPI measures. In particular, both the group potential technical and alloca-
tive MPIs can be decomposed to reveal changes in the group MPIs and changes in the group
reallocative MPIs.
Corollary 1. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions and propositions, we
have:
M gst = M st × TRM gst, (58)
and
AM gst = AM st × ARM gst, (59)
which both hold for any two periods s and t.
The proof of both of these follows from taking the group decompositions (31) and (32),
rearranging in terms of group potential eﬃciency, substituting them into their respective
group potential MPI measures, and rearranging to separate out the group MPIs from the
group reallocative MPI measures.
The intuition is very similar to that for Proposition 2, and in particularly the discussion
of the decomposition (53). Likewise these decompositions allow determination of the source
of changes in group potential MPIs. It is also important to observe that each component
of (58) and (59) can be constructed from the individual eﬃciency measures, as described in
Lemma 5 and Proposition 3.
Finally, we also have the following decomposition for the group potential revenue MPI:
Corollary 2. Given regularity axioms 1-6, and the above deﬁnitions and propositions, we
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have:
RM gst = M st × AM st × TRM gst × ARM gst, (60)
which holds for any two periods s and t.
The proof of this follows from substituting the decompositions (45) and (55) into decom-
position (53).
In words, this allows a fuller decomposition of the group potential revenue MPI, to more
precisely identify the sources of productivity change between some periods s and t. As with
other MPIs, the interpretation is that values greater than unity indicate an improvement over
time, values less than unity indicate a decline, and values equal to unity indicate no overall
change. The overall value can then be decomposed into other values, each of which is also
interpreted relative to unity. Thus in decomposition (60), if the group potential revenue MPI
has increased, was that due to improvements in the group technical MPI (M st), the group
allocative MPI (AM st) or the group reallocative MPIs (TRM
g
st and ARM
g
st)? These in turn
can be further decomposed by applying existing individual level MPI decompositions to the
group measures - for example the group technical MPI can be decomposed to diﬀerentiate
between group technological change and group eﬃciency change (for individual level MPI
decompositions see Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Lindgren & Roos (1994a), Fa¨re, Grosskopf, Norris &
Zhang (1994b), Simar & Wilson (1998) to mention just a few, and see Zelenyuk (2006) for
an example of a decomposition of aggregate MPI).
Overall, we have been able to derive group potential and group reallocative Malmquist pro-
ductivity indexes, and have done this in a manner which maintains analogous decompositions
of the group MPIs to those we had with the original measures. Unlike Zelenyuk (2006), our
results allow for the reallocation of inputs between DMUs, and so are applicable in a wider
variety of cases, especially measuring the productivity gains due to mergers.
A few important remarks are in order about these results:
Remark 1: Practical Implementation
Most components of our MPI measures (TEτ , REτ etc.) can be constructed from individual
eﬃciency measures, as must be clear from (14), (17) etc. In deriving the theoretical measures
we made no assumptions speciﬁc to any estimation technique, and the individual eﬃciency
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measures could be estimated using a variety of well established methods - Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA), Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) etc. Remark is only needed, then, on
practical estimation of the group potential eﬃciency measures. A common approach here is
to make two additional assumptions, as is usually done in the framework of Data Envelop-
ment Analysis (DEA), a common estimation method for MPIs. These assumptions are that
T k is convex and identical across DMUs. With these assumptions the results of Li & Ng
(1995) can be used to obtain
T gτ = KTτ , where Tτ = T
k
τ is convex, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K, ∀τ, (61)
and so here we will have for any period τ ,
P gτ (X) = KPτ (x˜), (62)
where x˜ ≡ K−1∑Kk=1 xk, so Pτ (x˜) is the output set of the average DMU in the group.
Using these results, the group potential eﬃciencies are equal to the eﬃciency measures of the
average DMU in the group, that is, we have:
REgτ (X, Y , p) = REτ (x˜, y˜, p), (63)
TEgτ (X, Y ) = TEτ (x˜, y˜), (64)
AEgτ (X, Y , p) = AEτ (x˜, y˜, p) = REτ (x˜, y˜, p)/TEτ (x˜, y˜), (65)
where y˜ ≡ K−1∑Kk=1 yk and where RE, TE and AE are as deﬁned in (7), (5) and (8)
respectively, with superscript k dropped. The proof of (63)-(65) can be found in Nesterenko
& Zelenyuk (2007).
Remark 2: Price Independent Weights
In practice, a researcher does not always have access to corresponding output prices. The
aggregation scheme presented here can still be used in this case, for example with shadow
prices (as in Li & Ng (1995)). Alternatively, price independent weights can be used, which
were originally developed by Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) and extended by Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2007)
and Simar & Zelenyuk (2007). The principle used here is to make the additional assumption
that the share of industry revenue from each output is a known constant, and then use the
resulting output revenue shares to calculate price independent weights. Speciﬁcally, for a
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given time period τ , assume:
pm,τY m,τ∑M
m=1 pm,τY m,τ
= am,τ , m = 1, ...,M, (66)
where Y m,τ =
∑K
k=1 y
k
m,τ , and am,τ ∈ [0, 1] (m = 1, ...,M) are constants (estimated or
assumed) such that
∑M
m=1 am,τ = 1. After obtaining such constants, let:
km,τ = y
k
m,τ/Y m,τ , (67)
be the industry share of DMU k in producing the mth output in period τ . The output-
oriented price independent weights in period τ for each DMU are then:
Skτ =
M∑
m=1
am,τ
k
m,τ , k = 1, . . . , K, (68)
which are the weighted sums of a DMU’s share of industry output for each output, weighted
by the industry revenue share of each output in period τ . A special case, applicable if
the am,τ were unavailable, is to assume them to be identical for all outputs, yielding an
unweighted arithmetic average of output shares, as in Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003). Note that
Simar & Zelenyuk (2007) also extend this to the subgroup context to derive price independent
weights for aggregating within and between subgroups in output orientation.
Remark 3: Geometric Decomposition
The group eﬃciency MPIs presented here uses an arithmetic averaging scheme, while many
researchers had been using an unweighted geometric average instead. Following discussion
in Zelenyuk (2006), we note that the arithmetic averaging is not ad hoc but comes from the
derivations. On the other hand, if a geometric weighting scheme were to use the same weights,
its ﬁrst order approximation around unity would be the same as that of the arithmetic scheme
we use. Monte Carlo simulations suggested that the diﬀerence between weighting schemes
is relatively small for the range of productivity changes commonly encountered in practice.
This suggests that if researchers prefer to use a geometric averaging scheme this is possible
in practice, although the economic justiﬁcation of the arithmetic averaging appears to have
more solid theoretical ground.
7. Numerical Example
Here, we present a numerical example using simulated data to illustrate the measures
derived above in practice. We start with the same simulated dataset as Fa¨re & Zelenyuk
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(2003) and Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007) for our ﬁrst period. This data is composed of two
inputs and two outputs for 20 DMUs, with ﬁrst period output prices of 1 and 0.1 respectively.
As for Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) and Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007), eﬃciency scores for each
DMU are calculated via Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with output orientation, assum-
ing variable returns to scale (though of course other estimation methods could also be used).
Our ﬁrst period results are the same as those of the previous papers, and are presented in
the appendix.
To calculate the MPI measures we need a second period of data. We create this by ap-
plying various transformations to the ﬁrst period data, to see its aﬀect on the resulting group
MPI measures. We present the aggregate ﬁrst and second period results for ﬁve transforma-
tions in Table 1. Throughout this section, the subscripts denote the time period, 1 or 2.
One can see that there is a sizeable reallocation eﬀect in this example in the ﬁrst period:
while without reallocation of inputs we could increase revenue by 21.8%, with reallocation
we could increase it by 43.5%. The group revenue reallocative measure thus indicates that
there is a further 17.8% potential improvement in group revenue available from reallocating
inputs optimally between DMUs. Similar statements apply to the second period results. The
full second period results are in the appendix.
The results (and estimating equations) for the MPI measures for the same transformations
are shown in Table 2. A few things stand out from these results.
• If we keep inputs and output prices constant but scale outputs upwards (as in trans-
formation 1, as could be the result of improved technology, etc.), the resulting group
revenue and technical MPIs (structural and potential) indicate productivity improve-
ment by the amount we scaled by, but all aggregate allocative and reallocative MPIs are
equal to unity. Intuitively, by scaling up outputs proportionally (while keeping inputs
and output prices ﬁxed) we have scaled up the estimated technology proportionally,
but the eﬃciency of our allocation within each period is unchanged; that is, the gains
to the aggregate revenue MPIs are purely from technological improvements, not any
allocative/price or reallocative improvements. Likeiwse, there are no group reallocative
MPI changes because our allocations between DMUs have not changed, nor has the
price ratio - just the technology. This is what one would expect should happen to the
aggregate indexes.
• If we keep inputs and outputs constant but scale output prices upwards (as in trans-
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Table 1 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
Summary of the ﬁrst and second period results
MPI Measure \ Type Revenue Technical Allocative
Period 1 x1, y1 and p1 = (1, 0.1)
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Transformation 1: x2 = x1, y2 = 2× y1, p2 = p1
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Transformation 2: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = 2× p1
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Transformation 3: x2 = x1, y2 ∼ U(0, 250) (both outputs), p2 = p1
Group structural eﬃciency 1.563 1.351 1.157
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.165 1.337 0.871
Group potential eﬃciency 1.820 1.807 1.007
Transformation 4: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = (1.5, 0.5)
Group structural eﬃciency 1.192 1.095 1.089
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.168 1.249 0.935
Group potential eﬃciency 1.393 1.367 1.018
Transformation 5: y2 = y1 ∀k, p2 = p1 , and x2 = x1 except for DMUs
k ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19} where x2 = 1.2× x1
Group structural eﬃciency 1.354 1.231 1.100
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.180 1.223 0.965
Group potential eﬃciency 1.598 1.505 1.062
Notes: The period 1 data and prices are from Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003), with the period 2 data
and prices created from the transformations listed above each set of results The subscripts indicate
the time period. Output-oriented DEA under the assumption of variable returns to scale is used
to derive the aggregate eﬃciency estimates, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R (though any linear programming solver could be used).
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Table 2 Illustrative example of group MPI measures
MPI Measure \ Type Revenue Technical Allocative
Equations:
Group (structural) MPI (44) (46) (47)
Group reallocative MPI (54) (56) (57)
Group potential MPI (49) (51) (52)
Transformation 1: x2 = x1, y2 = 2× y1, p2 = p1
Group (structural) MPI 2 2 1
Group reallocative MPI 1 1 1
Group potential MPI 2 2 1
Transformation 2: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = 2× p1
Group (structural) MPI 1 1 1
Group reallocative MPI 1 1 1
Group potential MPI 1 1 1
Transformation 3: x2 = x1, y2 ∼ U(0, 250) (both outputs), p2 = p1
Group (structural) MPI 1.751 1.633 1.073
Group reallocative MPI 1.000 0.910 1.099
Group potential MPI 1.751 1.485 1.179
Transformation 4: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = (1.5, 0.5)
Group (structural) MPI 1.022 1.004 1.017
Group reallocative MPI 1.009 0.996 1.013
Group potential MPI 1.030 1.000 1.030
Transformation 5: y2 = y1 ∀k, p2 = p1, and x2 = x1 except for DMUs
k ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19} where x2 = 1.2× x1
Group (structural) MPI 0.900 0.893 1.007
Group reallocative MPI 0.998 1.017 0.981
Group potential MPI 0.898 0.909 0.988
Notes: The period 1 data and prices are from Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003), with the period 2 data and
prices created from the transformations listed above each set of results. The subscripts indicate the
time period. Output-oriented DEA under the assumption of variable returns to scale is used to derive
the MPI estimates, following Lemma 5 and the propositions in section 6, using the Benchmarking
package in R.
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formation 2, as could be the results of inﬂation, etc.), the resulting aggregate MPIs
all equal unity. Intuitively, by scaling prices upwards proportionally, our technology
is unchanged and our price ratio is unchanged, so there is no change in productivity,
again as one would expect.
• If we keep inputs and output prices constant over time but period 2 outputs are un-
related to those in period 1 (as in transformation 3), the change in productivity will
depend on how those outputs have changed. In the particular example illustrated here,
there was a larger increase in the group technical MPI than the group potential tech-
nical MPI, and the group allocative MPIs have increased, but with other examples the
opposite eﬀects were observed. The one result that remains constant is that the group
revenue reallocative MPI always equals unity, which is to be expected. Intuitively,
while inputs and prices remain constant between both periods there is no change in the
potential group revenue gains from input reallocation, because maximal revenue de-
pends on optimal outputs, not actual outputs, and given unchanged prices and inputs,
optimal outputs are unchanged. To see this, re-express the group revenue reallocative
MPI, (54), in terms of the group revenue functions (following (28)):
RRM gst =
[(
Rgs(X, pt)/Rs(X, pt)
Rgs(X, ps)/Rs(X, ps)
· R
g
t (X, pt)/Rt(X, pt)
Rgt (X, ps)/Rt(X, ps)
)−1]1/2
, (69)
where the subscript for X and X are dropped as they are the same for both periods in
this example. If ps = pt the expression collapses to unity, regardless of the technology
in periods s and t.
• If we keep inputs and outputs constant but pick new prices that are not proportional
to the ﬁrst period (as in transformation 4), this leads to a number of changes. We
ﬁnd a change in the group revenue and allocative MPIs (structural and potential),
though how much and what direction would depend on the new price ratio relative
to the curvature of the frontier. We also see as a comparatively small change in the
group technical MPI and the reallocative MPIs, and no change in the group potential
technical MPI. In all cases, however, the change in group MPIs is very small compared
to the price change - in our numerical example we illustrate a 50% increase in the
price of good one and a 400% increase in the price of good two, but the change in the
group potential revenue MPI was only 3%, and even with more dramatic price changes
(including changing which output was more expensive between the two periods) the
group MPI changes were comparatively small. This shows that the group MPIs are
robust to price changes when quantities are unchanged. In particular, the change to the
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group technical MPI is comparatively small even to the other group MPIs. Intuitively,
changing the price ratio changes the revenue gained (and thus the revenue MPIs and
also the allocative MPIs) but does not change the technology, and hence is likely to
have a comparatively small eﬀect on the group technical MPI, only through changing
the weights. Moroever, as group potential technical eﬃciency, (22), is not aﬀected by
revenue shares, it is unchanged between the two periods (a result that holds whatever
price changes are made).
• Finally, we keep outputs and output prices constant and proportionally increase the
inputs of technically ineﬃcient DMUs (as in transformation 5). We ﬁnd, as we would
expect, that our group technical and revenue MPIs (both structural and potential) de-
crease, because the ineﬃcient DMUs have become more ineﬃcient. In this speciﬁc ex-
ample, all ineﬃcient DMUs (k ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19} increased their inputs
by 20%, leading to the aforementioned group MPIs decreasing by around 10%. Here,
there was little change in the aggregate allocative MPIs, showing that the decline was
mainly in technical eﬃciency, and virtually no change in the group reallocative revenue
and reallocative technical MPIs, indicating that there was little change in the possible
gains from reallocating inputs between DMUs. In other examples we tried (both in-
creasing and decreasing the inputs of the ineﬃcient DMUs) we witnessed these group
allocative and reallocative MPIs increasing, decreasing or being unchanged, though in
all cases the changes in the group reallocative MPIs were proportionally much smaller
than those in the group structural and potential MPIs.
In summary, we have illustrated several interesting cases in which the group potential and
reallocative MPI results will be unity. If all outputs for all DMUs increase proportionally
(inputs and output prices unchanged), the aggregate allocative and reallocative MPIs will be
unity. If output prices are scaled proportionally (inputs and output unchanged), all aggregate
MPIs will be unity. Whenever inputs and prices of outputs are constant between two periods,
the group revenue reallocative MPI will be equal to unity. If second period output prices
are not proportional to ﬁrst period output prices (inputs and outputs unchanged), the group
potential technical MPI will be unity, and the group technical MPI and group reallocative
MPIs will change in a comparatively small way to the group revenue and allocative MPIs.
Finally, if ineﬃcient DMUs increase their input usage (outputs and output prices unchanged),
all measures may change, though aggregate allocative and reallocative MPIs will have a
comparatively small change. This simple exercise thus provides some indication for what
researchers can expect in practical application of these techniques, and the interpretation of
such results.
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8. Conclusion
In this paper we have merged prior work on eﬃciency aggregation and productivity ag-
gregation to derive an aggregation scheme for Malmquist productivity indexes that allows
reallocation of inputs and outputs across DMUs. We have done this by constructing group
potential and group reallocative MPI measures. These group potential and reallocative MPIs
allow measurement over time of changes in group potential productivity when reallocation of
inputs amongst the group is possible. This is particularly relevant in considering the produc-
tivity gains due to restructuring branches within a ﬁrm, ﬁrms merging within an industry,
countries merging into an economic union, etc., as reallocation of inputs between DMUs is
possible in such scenarios. As our group Malmquist productivity indexes maintain analogous
decompositions to the original eﬃciency measures, they can be decomposed in a variety of
ways within and beyond existing MPI decompositions to give decision makers and researchers
greater insights into the source of gains or losses in productivity over time. These new group
Malmquist productivity indexes are not intended to replace existing results but to encompass
them. We also presented a number of numerical examples using DEA, to illustrate interesting
points of interpretation. While we used DEA for our illustration, the theoretical aggrega-
tion results derived in this work could also be calculated using other estimators if they were
preferred to DEA, e.g. to avoid the curse of dimensionality when many inputs/outputs are
used.
A number of natural extensions follow this work. First would be to develop a methodology
for bootstrapping the group Malmquist productivity indexes, to allow statistical inference
to be performed on the results. This could be done by merging the ideas of Simar & Wil-
son (1999) and Daskovska, Simar & Van Bellegem (2010) with Simar & Zelenyuk (2007),
Romanov (2005) and Simar & Wilson (2011). Another practical extension would be to de-
termine a methodology for estimating the group potential technology without requiring the
assumption that all individual technologies are convex and identical between DMUs. On the
theoretical side, group potential and reallocative productivity measures could be constructed
using other productivity indexes (for example the Hicks-Moorsteen productivity index, etc.).
The group reallocative productivity measure captures economies of both scale and scope to-
gether, but does not separate these eﬀects - this could be decomposed to separate out the
scale eﬀect. Finally, reallocation here is by construction considered for a given output mix,
as radial eﬃciency measures were used; use of other eﬃciency measures could relax this.
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10. Appendix
Table 3 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures: ﬁrst period results
# xk1 x
k
2 y
k
1 y
k
2 RE
k TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 39.00 49.00 12.00 17.53 2.200 1.773 1.241 0.652 0.771 0.846
2 37.00 45.00 19.00 22.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
3 35.00 55.00 17.29 17.00 1.929 1.891 1.021 0.744 0.723 1.028
4 34.00 63.97 25.00 12.97 1.957 1.884 1.039 0.733 0.726 1.010
5 33.00 53.00 28.00 18.72 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
6 70.00 50.00 35.00 43.00 1.516 1.476 1.027 0.946 0.926 1.022
7 45.00 55.56 25.00 0.00 1.915 1.712 1.118 0.750 0.799 0.938
8 60.00 62.38 45.00 37.42 1.540 1.477 1.043 0.932 0.926 1.006
9 30.00 83.33 75.00 64.03 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
10 40.00 90.00 34.00 59.27 2.279 1.397 1.631 1.630 0.979 0.643
11 75.00 75.00 82.00 75.00 1.107 1.072 1.033 1.296 1.276 1.016
12 45.00 125.00 78.00 101.70 1.086 1.000 1.086 1.321 1.367 0.966
13 60.00 93.75 35.00 93.54 2.417 1.256 1.925 0.594 1.089 0.545
14 87.00 53.57 75.00 120.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
15 85.00 66.18 85.00 111.00 1.009 1.000 1.009 1.422 1.367 1.040
16 91.00 99.00 100.00 171.00 1.102 1.000 1.102 1.302 1.367 0.952
17 115.20 169.00 115.00 212.00 1.198 1.000 1.198 1.198 1.367 0.876
18 86.40 240.00 80.00 151.00 1.425 1.104 1.290 1.007 1.238 0.813
19 247 189.00 230.00 347.00 1.069 1.035 1.033 1.343 1.322 1.016
20 240 180.00 247.00 359.00 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Notes: The same table can be found in Fa¨re & Zelenyuk (2003) and Nesterenko & Zelenyuk (2007).
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Table 4 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
second period results with transformation: x2 = x1, y2 = 2× y1, p2 = p1
# REk TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 2.200 1.773 1.241 0.652 0.771 0.846
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
3 1.929 1.891 1.021 0.744 0.723 1.028
4 1.957 1.884 1.039 0.733 0.726 1.010
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
6 1.516 1.476 1.027 0.946 0.926 1.022
7 1.915 1.712 1.118 0.750 0.799 0.938
8 1.540 1.477 1.043 0.932 0.926 1.006
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
10 2.279 1.397 1.631 1.630 0.979 0.643
11 1.107 1.072 1.033 1.296 1.276 1.016
12 1.086 1.000 1.086 1.321 1.367 0.966
13 2.417 1.256 1.925 0.594 1.089 0.545
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
15 1.009 1.000 1.009 1.422 1.367 1.040
16 1.102 1.000 1.102 1.302 1.367 0.952
17 1.198 1.000 1.198 1.198 1.367 0.876
18 1.425 1.104 1.290 1.007 1.238 0.813
19 1.069 1.035 1.033 1.343 1.322 1.016
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Notes: The period 2 data and prices are transformed as explained at the top of the table, with
the subcript indicating the time period. Estimates are derived from output-oriented DEA under
the assumption of variable returns to scale, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R.
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Table 5 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
second period results with transformation: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = 2× p1
# REk TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 2.200 1.773 1.241 0.652 0.771 0.846
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
3 1.929 1.891 1.021 0.744 0.723 1.028
4 1.957 1.884 1.039 0.733 0.726 1.010
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
6 1.516 1.476 1.027 0.946 0.926 1.022
7 1.915 1.712 1.118 0.750 0.799 0.938
8 1.540 1.477 1.043 0.932 0.926 1.006
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
10 2.279 1.397 1.631 1.630 0.979 0.643
11 1.107 1.072 1.033 1.296 1.276 1.016
12 1.086 1.000 1.086 1.321 1.367 0.966
13 2.417 1.256 1.925 0.594 1.089 0.545
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
15 1.009 1.000 1.009 1.422 1.367 1.040
16 1.102 1.000 1.102 1.302 1.367 0.952
17 1.198 1.000 1.198 1.198 1.367 0.876
18 1.425 1.104 1.290 1.007 1.238 0.813
19 1.069 1.035 1.033 1.343 1.322 1.016
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.435 1.367 1.049
Group structural eﬃciency 1.218 1.099 1.108 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.178 1.244 0.947
Group potential eﬃciency 1.435 1.367 1.049
Notes: The period 2 data and prices are transformed as explained at the top of the table, with
the subcript indicating the time period. Estimates are derived from output-oriented DEA under
the assumption of variable returns to scale, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R.
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Table 6 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
second period results with transformation: x2 = x1, y2 ∼ U(0, 250) (both outputs), p2 = p1
# REk TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 2.651 1.000 2.651 0.687 1.807 0.380
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.820 1.807 1.007
3 1.380 1.365 1.011 1.319 1.323 0.997
4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.820 1.807 1.007
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.820 1.807 1.007
6 1.661 1.652 1.005 1.096 1.094 1.002
7 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.820 1.807 1.007
8 11.607 1.040 11.163 0.157 1.738 0.090
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.820 1.807 1.007
10 1.894 1.878 1.008 0.961 0.962 0.999
11 2.381 2.312 1.030 0.764 0.782 0.978
12 1.407 1.369 1.028 1.294 1.320 0.980
13 1.106 1.043 1.061 1.646 1.733 0.950
14 3.251 3.142 1.035 0.560 0.575 0.974
15 1.096 1.072 1.022 1.661 1.685 0.985
16 1.532 1.000 1.532 1.188 1.807 0.657
17 2.419 2.348 1.030 0.753 0.770 0.978
18 1.524 1.437 1.060 1.194 1.257 0.950
19 18.277 10.107 1.808 0.100 0.179 0.557
20 1.298 1.210 1.073 1.402 1.494 0.939
Group structural eﬃciency 1.563 1.351 1.157 1.165 1.337 0.871
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.165 1.337 0.871
Group potential eﬃciency 1.820 1.807 1.007
Notes: The period 2 data and prices are transformed as explained at the top of the table, with
the subcript indicating the time period. Estimates are derived from output-oriented DEA under
the assumption of variable returns to scale, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R.
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Table 7 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
second period results with transformation: x2 = x1, y2 = y1, p2 = (0.5, 2)
# REk TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 1.844 1.773 1.040 0.773 0.771 1.002
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
3 1.899 1.891 1.005 0.750 0.723 1.038
4 2.881 1.884 1.529 0.495 0.726 0.682
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
6 1.780 1.476 1.205 0.801 0.926 0.865
7 9.814 1.712 5.733 0.145 0.799 0.182
8 2.109 1.477 1.428 0.676 0.926 0.730
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
10 1.512 1.397 1.083 0.942 0.979 0.963
11 1.508 1.072 1.407 0.945 1.276 0.741
12 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
13 1.361 1.256 .1.084 1.047 1.089 0.962
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 0.920
15 1.132 1.000 1.132 1.259 1.367 1.042
16 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
17 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
18 1.121 1.104 1.015 1.271 1.238 1.027
19 1.040 1.035 1.005 1.370 1.322 1.037
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.425 1.367 1.042
Group structural eﬃciency 1.166 1.082 1.078 1.223 1.264 0.967
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.223 1.264 0.967
Group potential eﬃciency 1.425 1.367 1.042
Notes: The period 2 data and prices are transformed as explained at the top of the table, with
the subcript indicating the time period. Estimates are derived from output-oriented DEA under
the assumption of variable returns to scale, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R.
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Table 8 Illustrative example of group eﬃciency measures:
second period results with transformation: y2 = y1 ∀k, p2 = p1, and x2 = x1
except for DMUs k ∈ {1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 19} where x2 = 1.2× x1
# REk TEk AEk RREk TREk AREk
1 4.027 3.326 1.211 0.397 0.452 0.877
2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.598 1.505 1.062
3 3.326 3.304 1.006 0.480 0.455 1.055
4 3.074 2.940 1.046 0.520 0.512 1.015
5 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.598 1.505 1.062
6 2.315 2.263 1.023 0.690 0.665 1.038
7 3.060 2.733 1.120 0.522 0.550 0.948
8 1.997 1.921 1.039 0.800 0.783 1.022
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.598 1.505 1.062
10 2.471 1.715 1.441 0.646 0.878 0.737
11 1.348 1.303 1.034 1.185 1.155 1.027
12 1.086 1.000 1.086 1.470 1.505 0.977
13 2.744 1.524 1.801 0.582 0.988 0.590
14 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.598 1.505 1.062
15 1.009 1.000 1.009 1.584 1.505 1.052
16 1.102 1.000 1.102 1.450 1.505 0.963
17 1.198 1.000 1.198 1.334 1.505 0.886
18 1.599 1.284 1.246 0.999 1.172 0.852
19 1.069 1.035 1.033 1.495 1.454 1.028
20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.598 1.505 1.062
Group structural eﬃciency 1.354 1.231 1.100 1.180 1.223 0.965
Group reallocative eﬃciency 1.180 1.223 0.965
Group potential eﬃciency 1.598 1.505 1.062
Notes: The period 2 data and prices are transformed as explained at the top of the table, with
the subcript indicating the time period. Estimates are derived from output-oriented DEA under
the assumption of variable returns to scale, following the lemmas in sections 3 and 4, using the
Benchmarking package in R.
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Highlights 
? We derive aggregate Malmquist productivity indexes allowing input reallocation. 
? The aggregation scheme is justified by economic theory 
? The aggregation scheme is coherent with previous aggregation results. 
? The aggregate indexes are relevant for firms or countries where reallocation of inputs 
is possible. 
Research Highlights
